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Interpreting the Chapeau of GATT Article XX in Light of the ‘New’ Approach 
in Brazil – Tyres 
 
 
Arwel Davies* 
 
Non-discrimination obligations in the WTO agreements continue to be intensely 
debated in terms of how to characterize what is prohibited, and what legal tests and 
methodologies should be applied.  This article engages with various aspects of this 
debate with reference to the different conceptions of the chapeau of GATT Article XX 
evident in the panel and Appellate Body reports in Brazil-Tyres.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Governmental measures which restrict trade in goods, and which are disputed at the 
WTO, are frequently analysed in three stages by panels and the Appellate Body.  Should 
a primary violation be confirmed, defendant states usually invoke an exceptions 
provision, the most prominent of which is GATT Article XX.  The Article XX analysis 
may go no further than provisional justification, if challenged measures are found not 
to be ‘necessary to protect public morals’ or ‘public health’, or found not ‘relate to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources’.  However, challenged measures which 
pass muster at the first hurdle, will then be subject to further appraisal under the chapeau 
which provides as follows: 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party 
of measures … 
 
The Appellate Body’s fullest general guidance on the role of the chapeau was provided 
in United States – Shrimp.1 Among the key statements is that the chapeau reflects ‘… 
the need to maintain a balance of rights and obligations between the right of a Member 
to invoke one or another of the exceptions of Article XX … on the one hand, and the 
substantive rights of the other Members under the GATT 1994, on the other hand.’2 
The report also contains some interesting insights into the negotiating history of Article 
XX.  Most of the chapeau as it appears above was absent from Article 32 of the United 
States Draft Charter for an International Trade Organization.3 During the First Session 
of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment in 1946, several delegations expressed concern about the possibility of 
                                                 
* School of Law Swansea University (a.p.davies@swan.ac.uk) 
1 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R 
(adopted 6 November 1998). 
2 Ibid., para. 156.  In a later passage, the task is described as that of ‘locating and marking out a line of 
equilibrium between…’ these ‘competing rights’ so that neither ‘will cancel out the other’.  Para. 159. 
3 This provision began merely with the phrase, ‘Nothing in Chapter IV of this Charter shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any member of measures: …’   
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abuse of the exceptions for protectionist reasons, and considered that an additional 
clause ought to be inserted.4 The proposed text of the United Kingdom closely reflects 
the formulation which was later adopted.5  
 
While the origins of the chapeau, and its overall purpose, are generally understood, less 
is known about the precise meaning which should be attributed to the chosen language.  
The task of providing specific guidance had been approached only from the most 
oblique of angles,6 a matter of some concern given the impact the chapeau can have on 
state regulatory autonomy.  In Brazil – Tyres7, however, the Appellate Body was 
required to show its hand by reason of the panel’s willingness to adopt interpretations 
of these phrases.  The panel’s approach was overruled by the Appellate Body, so that 
we now have two alternative conceptions of the applicable tests for determining 
compliance with the chapeau.  This article evaluates these two conceptions with 
reference to the queries which are sketched below. 
 
In general terms, the chapeau is an anti-discrimination provision.  Therefore, the central 
challenge facing an interpreter, and the logical starting point, is to formulate a test 
which is capable of revealing the type of discrimination which should be caught.  While 
it is not obvious upon first reading of the reports, the panel and the Appellate Body in 
Brazil - Tyres agreed with each other on what this test should be.  The question is 
whether the less favourable treatment of imported products can be explained with 
reference to the policy objectives recognized in the heads of provisional justification.  
By so formulating the test, the tribunals seem to have endorsed the prevailing view that 
anti-discrimination provisions in the WTO Treaty texts are intended to catch 
discrimination based on nationality.8 The test can be regarded as a proxy for directly 
                                                 
4 Note 154 of the Appellate report in Shrimp sets out the concerns of the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg to the effect that: 
Indirect protection is an undesirable and dangerous phenomenon. … Many times, 
the stipulations to ‘protect animal or plant life or health’ are misused for indirect 
protection. It is recommended to insert a clause which prohibits expressly to direct 
such measures that they constitute an indirect protection or, in general, to use these 
measures to attain results, which are irreconsiliable [sic] with the aim of chapters IV, 
V and VI. E/PC/T/C.II/32, 30 October 1946. 
Developing countries shared this concern.  For example, South Africa commented that the exceptions 
‘were rational but were open to widespread abuse’ and that a ‘provision to prevent abuse’ should be 
incorporated.  E/PC/T/C.II/50 at 6. 
5 The United Kingdom’s proposed text for the chapeau read: 
The undertaking in Chapter IV of this Charter relating to import and export 
restrictions shall not be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
member of measures for the following purposes, provided that they are not applied 
in such a manner as to constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade. E/PC/T/C.II/50, pp. 7 and 9; E/PC/T/C.II/54/Rev.1, 28 
November 1946, at 36. 
6 In United States – Gasoline, it was noted that, ‘…the kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding 
whether the application of a particular measure amounts to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”, 
may also be taken into account in determining the presence of a “disguised restriction” on international 
trade.’ However, in respect of neither phrase was any guidance provided on what the pertinent 
considerations might be.  United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted 20 May 1996),  page 25.     
7 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted 17 December 
2007). 
8 Howse and Regan have thoroughly defended the view that, ‘…distinctions of nationality are 
irrelevant to economic efficiency.  Products which differ only in their nationality should have the same 
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asking whether there is country-based discrimination.  If there is a valid explanation 
for a challenged measure, it should be exonerated, even if the detrimental effect of the 
measure is felt mainly by imported products.  In contrast, the absence of such an 
explanation strongly suggests that the measure distinguishes between domestic and 
imported products based on the illegitimate criterion of their origin.   
 
A further issue for decision when interpreting the chapeau language is whether there is 
anything more to consider once discrimination of this nature has been detected.  If there 
is no valid explanation for the less favourable treatment of imported products, does this 
mean that there is ‘…arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail…’, or merely that there is some discrimination of the 
prohibited kind ‘…between countries where the same conditions prevail…’?  Is the 
term ‘unjustifiable’ a tautology, in the sense that discrimination of the prohibited kind 
is self-evidently unjustifiable, or, is there an issue over precisely what can exacerbate 
an initial finding of some discrimination, such as to render it unjustifiable?  This further 
issue represents the main area of disagreement between the panel and the Appellate 
Body.  The panel considered that there was a need to attribute a distinct meaning to the 
term ‘unjustifiable’ and, in so doing, adopted an effects based approach which depends 
upon a consideration of trade flows.  Section II explains the panel’s approach, noting 
that part of its reasoning which echoes the views expressed in the literature on the nature 
of objectionable discrimination.  It is suggested that the panel’s sequencing of the 
different issues is flawed, and a more logical order is proposed.  
  
From the perspective of attributing a distinct meaning to the term ‘unjustifiable’, the 
panel seems to provide a very satisfying solution.  However, in rejecting the panel’s 
thinking, the Appellate Body considered that trade effects must be irrelevant under the 
chapeau, because they are irrelevant in considering whether there is discrimination 
under the primary violation analysis.  Section III suggests that this position overlooks 
the sometimes decisive relevance of trade flows in the primary violation analysis, as 
evidenced most notably by the Korea – Beef9 case.  It is also argued that, even if trade 
effects are irrelevant in the primary violation analysis, this can be regarded as a good 
reason for why they should be relevant in the chapeau analysis.  Nevertheless, attention 
is also drawn to a valid, and probably sufficient, reason for rejecting the effects based 
approach which featured prominently in the third party submissions, but not in the 
Appellate Body’s reasoning.  The approach is inherently uncertain.   
 
Section IV proceeds to discuss the Appellate Body’s alternative conception of 
discrimination under the chapeau.  Attention is given to the rather peculiar provenance 
of this approach.  It appears to be an endorsement of an argument made by the United 
States in United States – Shrimp.  What is surprising, however, is that the approach 
which has now been explicitly endorsed, was just as explicitly rejected in Shrimp.  Still 
                                                 
competitive opportunities.’ Robert Howse and Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction – An 
Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy 11 European Journal of International 
Law 2 (2000) 249-289 at 270.  More recently, Pauwelyn has noted that, ‘the core of any non-
discrimination principle lies in the test of whether the regulation, either in law or in effect distinguishes 
based on national origin.’  Joost Pauwelyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Likeness, 
http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/pauwelyn/pdf/unbearable_lightness.pdf visited on 10 July 2008. 
9 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161,169/AB/R 
(adopted 10 January 2001) 
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more surprising is that the approach rejected in Shrimp was actually applied in this very 
case, and arguably also in United States - Gasoline.   
 
Having revealed the presence of the ‘new’ approach in the earlier case law, section V 
explores the major points of contrast between the panel and Appellate Body approaches 
suggested above.  Both tribunals questioned whether there was a rational connection 
between the reason for the discrimination and a recognized policy objective.  However, 
the panel and the Appellate Body found this test in different parts of the chapeau 
language.  Also, under the Appellate Body’s approach, a failure to meet this test is 
decisive and brings the appraisal of the measure to an end.  In contrast, under the panel’s 
approach, even it this test is not satisfied, it remains possible for a measure to be 
exonerated based on a consideration of trade flows.  The ways in which this additional 
test could be depicted as advantageous are identified, and weighed against the 
uncertainty inherent in the consideration of trade flows.     
 
The second half of the article works through the implications of the Appellate Body’s 
approach with a particular enquiry in mind.  The discussion revolves around whether 
this approach blurs certain boundaries inherent in the structure of the GATT Treaty 
text.  To the extent that indistinct boundaries might arise, it is questioned whether this 
should cause concern from perspectives such as creating too strict or permissive a 
regulatory environment, and depriving some of the Treaty language of meaning and 
function.   
 
Section VI notes that the Appellate Body has not, until now, openly acknowledged its 
view of the chapeau, because it could be perceived to have blurred the Article XX 
internal boundary between provisional justification, and the chapeau.  In the decade 
between Shrimp and Tyres, the Appellate Body seems to have formed the view that the 
now endorsed approach will rarely blur this boundary in any sense which need elicit 
concern.  It will demonstrated how this would seem to be the correct (but by no means 
obvious) view.  Section VII considers the implications of the Appellate Body’s 
approach for what is an especially important boundary according to the Appellate Body 
warned in Gasoline10 – that between the primary violation and chapeau analyses.  The 
section examines the various techniques which have been used to maintain a clear 
distinction, and questions the extent to which the chapeau’s focus on the way in which 
measures are ‘applied’ can be used to justify these techniques.  Attention is then given 
to the view that a clear division was achieved in Tyres only by reason of a flawed 
primary violation analysis.  It is argued that, even with a thoroughly revised primary 
violation analysis, the boundary would have remained intact.    
 
Section VIII brings together the two themes of the nature of objectionable 
discrimination, and blurred boundaries.  Proposals for the adoption of what is now the 
chapeau test have been advanced not only in this context, but also, and primarily, in the 
context of national treatment primary violations.  This is simply because the nature of 
objectionable discrimination is the same, notwithstanding the location of the anti-
discrimination provision in the Treaty text.  However, the combination of the chapeau 
test, and what can be referred to as the early consideration of the aim of a measure, or 
regulatory purpose, within the primary violation analysis, would collapse the boundary 
whose importance was emphasized in Gasoline.  This section goes against the tide 
                                                 
10 US-Gasoline, page 23.  The relevant passage is set out in section III. 
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somewhat in suggesting that there is no great imperative in the trade context for 
questions conventionally associated with Article XX to be considered in the national 
treatment analysis.  Section IX concludes.  
 
Before embarking upon the analysis, a brief statement of the facts and findings in Tyres 
is provided below in so far as relevant to the content outlined above. 
 
The challenged measure in Brazil – Tyres was in the form of an import ban on retreaded 
and used tyres with the rationale for the prohibition being the established connection 
between the accumulation of waste tyres at the end of their useful life, and risks to 
human, animal and plant life and health.  Waste tyres provide suitable breeding grounds 
for disease carrying mosquitoes and, if burnt, release toxic emissions which cause all 
manner of human health problems.  The import ban, however, eventually came to be 
incomplete in two respects.  An exemption for remoulded tyres (a sub-category of 
retreaded tyres) from other MERCOSUR countries was incorporated into the measure 
as a result of a ruling by a MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal.  The second aspect of 
incompleteness was that significant volumes of used tyre casings were being imported 
by Brazilian retreaders who had obtained injunctions from their domestic courts 
preventing the enforcement of the ban against them.  Brazilian retreading firms were 
therefore able to manufacture retreaded tyres made from casings of European origin, 
even though European firms were unable to export retreaded tyres to Brazil.  Overall, 
the Panel found for the European Communities, confirming its view that the import ban 
was a quantitative restriction in violation of GATT Article XI:1 violation which could 
not be exonerated under Article XX.   
 
Within the Article XX analysis, the Panel found that the import ban could be 
provisionally justified under paragraph (b) as being ‘necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health’.  This finding was upheld on appeal.  However, the panel went 
on to find that the chapeau was not satisfied.  Here, the panel considered that the 
MERCOSUR exemption, and the court injunctions, should be regarded as aspects of 
the application of the import ban.  For the Panel, the MERCOSUR exemption did not 
fall foul of the chapeau, a finding which was successfully appealed by the European 
Communities.  Even the panel, however, considered that the injunctions obtained by 
Brazilian firms breached the chapeau, a finding which was upheld by the Appellate 
Body.  In sum, the European Communities ‘won’ the case at both levels, but by a more 
convincing margin on appeal.   
 
II. THE PANEL’S EFFECTS BASED APPROACH TO THE CHAPEAU 
 
In attributing meaning to the terms used in the chapeau, the panel adopted an effects 
based approach.  What mattered was the extent to which the discrimination was 
manifesting itself in trade flows, and, therefore, the extent to which the discrimination 
was undermining the policy objective.  The panel began by noting that the 
MERCOSUR exemption had the potential to significantly undermine the policy 
objective of the import ban.11 Firms from MERCOSUR countries benefiting from the 
exemption could of course obtain the required raw material (used tyre casing) from 
their own territory.  However, they might also choose to obtain the casings from other 
                                                 
11 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Used Tyres, WT/DS332/R (adopted as modified by the 
Appellate Body Report, 17 December 2007), para. 7.286. 
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countries, process them in their own territory, and then export them to Brazil.  
Therefore, there was no real limit on the potential supply of suitable casings for the 
purposes of meeting demand for retreaded tyres in Brazil.   
 
The Panel, however, was concerned with the actual trade flows reflected in the data at 
its disposal:     
 
If such imports were to take place in such amounts that the achievement 
of the objective of the measure at issue would be significantly 
undermined, the application of the import ban in conjunction with the 
MERCOSUR exemption would constitute a means of unjustifiable 
discrimination. The more imports enter Brazilian territory through the 
exemption, the more Brazil's declared policy objective of reducing the 
unnecessary accumulation of waste tyres to the greatest extent possible 
will be undermined, thereby affecting the justification for the 
maintenance of the import ban vis-à-vis non-MERCOSUR WTO 
Members….12 
 
The Panel then based its conclusion of the absence of ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’ 
discrimination’ on the finding that, as of the date of its examination, ‘volumes of 
imports of retreaded tyres under the exemption appear not to have been significant’.13 
 
The same approach was applied with respect to the injunctions granted to Brazilian 
importers of used tyres, albeit with a different result.  The panel noted that, [T]he 
granting of injunctions allowing used tyres to be imported … effectively allows the 
very used tyres that are prevented from entering into Brazil after retreading to be 
imported before retreading.’14 The Panel went on to find both that, [T]his has the direct 
potential to undermine the objective of the prohibition on importation of retreaded 
tyres’, and that the objective had actually been significantly undermined because of the 
import volumes.15  
 
The panel then went on to consider whether the discrimination was occurring ‘between 
countries where the same conditions prevail’.  The panel began here by clarifying the 
nature of the discrimination created by the court injunctions.  It seems clear from the 
passage below that this discrimination was in the nature of a national treatment 
violation: 
 
We first recall that the discrimination at issue, which arises from the 
importation through court injunctions of used tyres, favours tyres 
retreaded in Brazil using imported casings, to the detriment of 
imported retreaded tyres made from the same casings. The 
                                                 
12 Ibid., para. 7.288. 
13 Ibid., para. 7.288. Even though there had been a 10 fold increase in the volume of imported retreaded 
tyres by weight between 2002 and 2004, the numbers involved remained modest having risen to only 
2000 tons per year by 2004. 
14 Ibid., para. 7.295 (emphasis in original). 
15 Ibid., paras 7.296-7.297.  The statistics here showed that imports of used tyres has increased by a 
factor of 7.5 between the year of enactment of the import ban (2000), and 2005.  More tellingly, 
imports of used tyres had increased from less than 10,000 tons in 2000, to over 70,000 tons in 2005.  
Clearly, the increase here is of a different order than that associated with the MERCOSUR exemption. 
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discrimination thus arises between Brazil and other WTO Members, 
including the European Communities.16 
 
The Panel then stated a position expressed on a number of occasions in the report that 
there was no difference from a waste management point of view between imported 
retreaded tyres, and retreaded tyres made in Brazil from imported casings.17 For a 
couple of reasons, this is an interesting interpretation of the phrase ‘between countries 
where the same conditions prevail’.  The approach clearly signals that prevailing 
conditions between countries can be compared with reference to the likeness of the 
products manufactured in these countries.  If the products are ‘like’, this can be a 
sufficient basis for finding that prevailing conditions between countries are the same.  
More important is the method by which the Panel determines whether the products are 
‘like’ / whether prevailing conditions as between countries are ‘the same’.  The 
approach resonates with the ideas of several scholars on how likeness should be 
determined. 
 
Howse and Regan have written in the context of GATT Article III that products are 
‘like’, ‘if and only if they do not differ in any respect relevant to an actual non-
protectionist policy’.18 The idea of defining likeness with reference to regulatory 
purpose finds expression in the Panel’s approach towards the chapeau.  The tyres were 
‘like’, and prevailing conditions between countries were ‘the same’, because the tyres 
did not differ in any respect relevant to the protection of public health.   
 
Very comparable views to those expressed by Howse and Regan have been advanced 
specifically in the context of the chapeau phrase now under examination.  Gaines 
recognises the need for ‘a jurisprudence to decide which “conditions” are pertinent’, 
when comparing prevailing conditions between countries under the chapeau.  He notes 
that, ‘[T]he only principled basis on which to select the relevant conditions for 
comparison is that they should have something to do with the declared objectives of the 
measure.’19 This idea seems to add context to the Panel’s comment that, ‘Brazil has not 
identified any difference between the conditions prevailing in Brazil and in other WTO 
Members, that would be pertinent in the context of considering whether the 
discrimination  …  occurs between countries where the same conditions prevail.20 A 
more recent contribution by Qin presents the most sustained defence of the idea that, 
‘it is legally sound to examine the relationship between the measure and its declared 
policy objective under the chapeau standards.’21 The Panel seemed to agree.   
 
The panel’s approach to the chapeau can be summarized in three stages.  The first 
question was whether there was any discrimination.  While the panel did not expressly 
say so, it effectively considered that the import ban was applied in a discriminatory 
manner in two respects.  The MERCOSUR exemption resulted in discrimination in the 
nature of a most favoured nation treatment violation, since MERCOSUR firms could 
                                                 
16 Ibid., para. 7.308. 
17 Ibid., para. 7.309. 
18 Howse and Regan, The Product/Process Distinction, as note 8 above, at 260. 
19 Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on 
Environmental Measures, 22 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 
(2001), 739-862, at 779.    
20 Brazil-Tyres, para. 7.309. 
21 Julia Ya Qin, Defining Nondiscrimination Under the Law of the World Trade Organization, 23 
Boston University International Law Journal (2005), 215-297 at 265. 
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export retreaded tyres to Brazil, while European firms could not.  As noted above, it 
also seems clear that the court injunctions resulted in discrimination in the form of a 
national treatment violation.  The second question was whether this discrimination was 
‘unjustifiable’ and it is here that the panel developed its effects based approach.  There 
may well be an insurmountable problem with this approach (discussed below), but it at 
least provides a way of thinking about how discrimination can be exacerbated to such 
an extent as to become ‘unjustifiable’ under the chapeau.  The third and final question 
is whether the unjustifiable discrimination occurs between countries where the same 
conditions prevail.   
 
The sequencing of these three stages is, unfortunately, illogical.  This is revealed when 
the three stages are applied in the sequence preferred by the panel, but the finding under 
the third stage is changed.  If the first two findings are retained, the conclusion is that 
there is discrimination, which is unjustifiable because of the extent of the trade effects.  
Suppose, however, that this unjustifiable discrimination is not occurring between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, because of some difference between tyres 
from different origins which is relevant to the policy objective.  This would surely 
require a reversal of the finding that the discrimination is unjustifiable.  Regardless of 
how pronounced the trade effects of the discrimination under the second test, if there is 
a legitimate explanation for the different treatment of products from different countries 
under the third test, the chapeau will not be breached.  This point can be brushed aside 
by regarding both the second and third tests as jointly determinative of whether the 
discrimination is unjustifiable.  However, this was not the approach adopted by the 
panel, and it also seems preferable to adopt a different, and entirely coherent, sequence.           
 
The logical sequence would be, first, to consider whether there is any treatment which 
could potentially be regarded as discriminatory.  This is demonstrated by the disparate 
impact of the MERCOSUR exemption and court injunctions.  The second issue is 
whether any such potentially discriminatory treatment occurs between countries where 
the same conditions prevail.  An affirmative answer here would justify a finding of 
some discrimination, leaving the third issue of whether this discrimination rises to the 
level of being ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’.  Under this preferable sequence, the cause or 
rationale of the discrimination would always be considered before trade effects, as part 
of the process of determining whether there is any discrimination.   
 
However, the single most important point about the panel’s approach applies regardless 
of how the issues are sequenced.  Under the panel’s approach, measures can be 
exonerated under the chapeau based on a finding of limited trade effects, even if there 
is no acceptable cause or rationale for the discrimination; in other words, even if there 
is country based discrimination.  Once it has been decided that there is discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, a further trade effects test applies.  
This test is conceptually distinct from the other tests, and (at least potentially22) wholly 
independent.  As will be discussed later in the article, the same observation does not 
apply to the Appellate Body’s alternative approach towards the chapeau.  Before 
coming to this approach, however, the response to the panel’s effects based approach 
will be discussed.   
 
                                                 
22 This caveat is added because trade effects can be relevant to the issue of whether there is any 
discrimination at all, a point which is discussed in Section III of the main text. 
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III. THE APPELLATE BODY’S RESPONSE TO THE EFFECTS BASED 
APPROACH 
 
One of the Appellate Body’s observations about the effects based approach was that, 
‘…the Panel’s interpretation of the term “unjustifiable” does not depend on the cause 
or rationale of the discrimination but, rather, is focused exclusively on the assessment 
of the effects of the discrimination.’23 This is technically correct because the statement 
only relates to the panel’s approach to the second of its tests – whether the 
discrimination is unjustifiable.  However, a more complete assessment of the panel’s 
approach would acknowledge the relevance of the cause or rationale of the 
discrimination in the third test.  In assessing whether the discrimination was between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, the panel considered whether there was 
any difference from a waste management point of view between imported retreaded 
tyres, and retreaded tyres made in Brazil from imported casings.  The conclusion that 
there was no difference, is effectively a conclusion that there was no acceptable cause 
or rationale for the discrimination.  This point becomes clear once it is observed that 
there would have been an acceptable cause or rationale for the discrimination if the tyres 
receiving the less favourable treatment were somehow more difficult to dispose of 
safely.  The explanation for the discrimination would then have been to protect public 
health.    
 
However, the Appellate Body’s intention was probably to signal its disapproval of the 
centrally important characteristic of the panel’s approach – the possibility of 
exonerating measures based on their limited trade effects.   
 
Another of the Appellate Body’s reasons for rejecting the Panel’s approach was 
provided in note 437, as follows:   
 
We also observe that the Panel's approach was based on a logic that is 
different in nature from that followed by the Appellate Body when it 
addressed the national treatment principle under Article III:4 of the GATT 
1994 in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II. In that case, the Appellate Body 
stated that Article III aims to ensure ‘equality of competitive conditions for 
imported products in relation to domestic products’.  The Appellate Body 
added that ‘it is irrelevant that “the trade effects” of the [measure at issue], 
as reflected in the volumes of imports, are insignificant or even non-
existent’.   For the Appellate Body, ‘Article III protects expectations not of 
any particular trade volume but rather of the equal competitive relationship 
between imported and domestic products.’24   
 
Issue can be taken with the view that trade effects are irrelevant when determining 
whether there has been a violation of GATT Article III:4.  It seems more accurate to 
state that trade effects are only formally irrelevant, but can also be a decisive evidential 
consideration.  National measures can ‘modify the conditions of competition’25 
between domestic and imported products to the detriment of the latter, without trade 
                                                 
23 Brazil-Tyres, para. 229. 
24 Ibid., note 437 (references omitted). 
25 This phrase seems first to have been used by the GATT panel in Italian Discrimination Against 
Imported Agricultural Machinery, L/833 – 7S60 (adopted 23 October 1958), para. 12.  The phrase is 
also elevated to the status of Treaty text by the GATS National Treatment provision Article XVII:3.   
 10 
effects in the sense of a reduced volume of imports.  However, if there are such trade 
effects, this will provide evidence that the conditions of competition have been 
modified.  These points are illustrated by the Appellate Body’s approach to the Article 
III:4 violation in Korea – Beef, where the existence of the violation was based on the 
pronounced trade effects of the measure.  The following passage sets the scene:    
 
…the Korean measure formally separates the selling of imported beef and 
domestic beef.  However, [contrary to what the Panel decided] that formal 
separation, in and of itself, does not necessarily compel the conclusion 
that the treatment thus accorded to imported beef is less favourable than 
the treatment accorded to domestic beef.  To determine whether the 
treatment given to imported beef is less favourable than that given to 
domestic beef, we must, as earlier indicated, inquire into whether or not 
the Korean dual retail system for beef modifies the conditions of 
competition in the Korean beef market to the disadvantage of the imported 
product.26 (emphasis in original) 
 
The Appellate Body then proceeded to determine that the conditions of competition had 
been modified by considering the actual (rather than potential) trade effects of Korea’s 
dual retail system.  In the whole of paragraph 145, the Appellate Body emphasises its 
conviction that, in this case, it was necessary to go beyond the face of the measure, and 
consider the trade effects generated by it, in order to determine whether there was less 
favourable treatment.  It was noted, for example, that, [T]he result [of the response of 
beef retailers to the dual retail system] was the virtual exclusion of imported beef from 
the retail distribution channels through which domestic beef (and until then, imported 
beef, too) was distributed to Korean households and other consumers throughout the 
country.’ 
 
There is therefore an argument that trade effects can be relevant to the existence of a 
primary violation, and may even be decisive.  It is possible to depict the Panel’s 
approach as consistent with the methodology for the primary violation analysis.  Let us 
proceed, however, by accepting that trade effects are irrelevant in the context of the 
primary violation analysis.  Does this mean that trade effects must also be irrelevant 
under the chapeau? 
 
Arguably, the position is quite the contrary to the extent that trade effects ought to be 
relevant in the chapeau analysis, for the very reason that they are not relevant in the 
primary violation analysis.  The reason for this relates to the structure of the GATT / 
WTO legal texts, under which discrimination can be relevant in both the primary 
violation and chapeau analyses.   The need for a clear distinction between the two 
analyses was recognized by the Appellate Body in the United States - Gasoline case, 
where the primary violation was of Article III:4. A key insight in the Appellate Body’s 
reasoning was the explanation of why a finding of discrimination under Article III, 
cannot lead to a finding of discrimination under the chapeau:   
 
The provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to the same 
standard(s) by which a violation of a substantive rule has been 
determined to have occurred. To proceed down that path would be both 
                                                 
26 Korea –  Beef, para. 144. 
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to empty the chapeau of its contents and to deprive the exceptions in 
paragraphs (a) to (j) of meaning. Such recourse would also confuse the 
question of whether inconsistency with a substantive rule existed, with 
the further and separate question arising under the chapeau of Article 
XX as to whether that inconsistency was nevertheless justified.27 
 
It will be questioned later on (in Section VIII) whether this passage over-emphasises 
the importance of the boundary between the primary violation and chapeau analyses.  
For the moment, however, it can readily be seen how the conditioning of compliance 
with the chapeau on the absence of a significant undermining of the policy objective, 
could provide a means of distinguishing the primary violation, and chapeau analyses.  
The trade effects of measures would only be considered within the chapeau analysis. 
 
Might there be other reasons for regarding the consideration of trade effects as an 
unsound basis for determining the ‘unjustifiable’ nature of discrimination under the 
chapeau?  Surprisingly, the most obvious reason for avoiding trade effects was not 
referred to by the Appellate Body within its own reasoning, even though the European 
Communities, and all but one of the third parties in the dispute, presented arguments 
based on this reason.28 These arguments were brought together in the extract from a 
third party submission provided below, the final sentence of which raises an interesting 
point, which was not explicitly raised in the other submissions: 
 
The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu 
further suggests that the Panel’s findings in this dispute might cause 
confusion for WTO Members when assessing whether a specific measure 
is WTO-consistent, create a tendency for WTO Members to initiate a 
multiplicity of WTO disputes, and undermine the security and 
predictability needed to conduct future trade.  These problems stem from 
the Panel’s failure to provide clear criteria for determining what volume 
of imports or increase in import volumes would be considered 
‘significant’.  Moreover, since import volumes are generally determined 
by supply and demand, the Panel’s significance test, if adopted, would 
make it difficult for WTO Members, who do not have the power to control 
trade flows into their domestic markets, to adopt WTO-consistent 
measures or to eliminate WTO-inconsistent measures.29 
 
This passage requires little explanation, although it is worth adding that, even if it were 
possible to provide clear criteria, the WTO consistency of the measure could vary from 
year to year (or any shorter or longer a time period considered to be appropriate) as 
trade flows fluctuate.  The uncertainty inherent in the Panel’s approach is illustrated by 
Australia’s views.  While perhaps not wholly opposed to the quantitative approach, 
Australia (unlike the panel) considered that the import levels by reason of the 
MERCOSUR exemption ‘did not appear to be insignificant or without practical 
impact.’30   
 
                                                 
27 United States – Gasoline, page 23. 
28 Brazil – Tyres, European Communities, paras 36 and 221; Australia, para. 93; Japan, para. 97; Korea 
para. 104; United States para. 115. 
29 Ibid., para. 111. 
30 Ibid., para. 93. 
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It is possible to argue that, in other areas of world trade law, the permissibility of 
measures which restrict trade, depend upon a consideration of trade flows.  A loose 
analogy can be made with the safeguards context in which the right to impose a 
safeguard measures is conditioned upon national investigating authorities 
demonstrating the existence of increased imports.31 While it is known that some 
methodologies do not provide a sufficient basis for the imposition of safeguards, there 
is uncertainty about precisely when authorities can confidently conclude that the 
requisite increase is present.32 Perhaps the key point here, however, is that this 
uncertainty is unavoidable by reason of the need to apply a test embedded in the Treaty 
text, rather than the need to apply a judicially created test.  It seems difficult to discount 
the concerns over the uncertainty of the Panel’s approach.  However, it is probably wise 
to defer judgement on whether this is a sufficient basis to reject the effects based 
approach, until the relative merits of the Appellate Body’s approach have been fully 
evaluated.  
 
IV. THE APPELLATE BODY’S ALTERNATIVE APPROACH AND ITS 
PROVENANCE 
 
The crucial passage in the Appellate report was as follows: 
 
…there is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination when a measure 
provisionally justified under a paragraph of Article XX is applied in a 
discriminatory manner “between countries where the same conditions 
prevail”, and when the reasons given for this discrimination bear no 
rational connection to the objective falling within the purview of a 
paragraph of Article XX, or would go against that objective.33 
 
In terms of provenance, this approach can be traced back to a view presented by the 
United States in Shrimp on how it should be determined whether discrimination under 
the chapeau is ‘unjustifiable’.  This view was set out by the Appellate Body as follows:  
 
[A]n evaluation of whether a measure constitutes “unjustifiable 
discrimination [between countries] where the same conditions prevail” 
should take account of whether differing treatment between countries 
relates to the policy goal of the applicable Article XX exception. If a 
measure differentiates between countries based on a rationale legitimately 
connected with the policy of an Article XX exception, rather than for 
                                                 
31 Agreement on Safegaurds, Articles 2:1 and 4.2. 
32 It is certain that a challenged investigation will be found to be inadequate if it does not proceed beyond 
comparing import levels at two points in time. The requirement in Article 4.2(a) to assess the ‘rate and 
amount’ of the increase requires that consideration be given to fluctuations in import levels between 
these two points.  However, there is uncertainty over what pattern of fluctuations might lead the Appellate 
Body to strike down a finding of increased imports, in particular, where imports are declining towards 
the end of the investigation.  See United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain Imports of 
Steel Products, WT/DS248,249,251,252,253,254,258,259/AB/R (adopted 10 December 2003), paras 
352-355.  
33 Brazil - Tyres, para. 227. 
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protectionist reasons, the measure does not amount to an abuse of the 
applicable Article XX exception.34 (emphasis in original) 
 
As with the key passage in Tyres, the intention here is clearly to link the concept of 
‘unjustifiable’ discrimination under the chapeau, with the policy goals under which a 
measure can be provisionally justified.  A useful shorthand version of the test is that 
there will be ‘unjustifiable’ discrimination in the absence of a ‘rational connection’ 
between the reasons for the discrimination, and the objectives reflected in the heads of 
provisional justification. 
 
In United States – Shrimp, the Appellate Body displayed an ambivalent attitude towards 
this suggested approach.  As noted in the introduction, it was both explicitly rejected, 
and implicitly applied.  The explicit rejection was informed by a desire to avoid blurring 
the boundary within Article XX between the initial stage of provisional justification, 
and the second stage of applying the chapeau.  It was noted that:  
 
the policy goal of a measure cannot provide its rationale or justification 
under the standards of the chapeau of Article XX. The legitimacy of the 
declared policy objective of the measure, and the relationship of that 
objective with the measure itself and its general design and structure, are 
examined under [the heads of provisional justification].35  
 
A few pages into the report, however, the rejected test is applied: 
 
…shrimp caught using methods identical to those employed in the 
United States have been excluded from the United States market solely 
because they have been caught in waters of countries that have not been 
certified by the United States.  The resulting situation is difficult to 
reconcile with the declared policy objective of protecting and 
conserving sea turtles.36 (emphasis in original) 
 
The concern in this passage is that the measure, as applied, amounted to country based 
discrimination.  In other words, imports were discriminated against purely because of 
their origin, rather than on the basis of any legitimate criteria.  The rejected test is 
applied in the closing sentence of the passage.  The Appellate Body effectively 
identifies the absence of a rational connection between the reason for the 
discrimination, (being the fact that some exporting countries had not been certified) and 
                                                 
34 United States – Shrimp, para. 148. 
35 Ibid., para. 149. 
36 Ibid., para 165. 
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the conservation objective reflected in Article XX(g).37 Indeed, the Brazil – Tyres report 
confirms that the now endorsed test was applied in United States – Shrimp.38 
 
In the first case to be heard by the Appellate Body, United States – Gasoline, it would 
be an overstatement to claim that the ‘new’ test was clearly applied.  However, the 
chapeau findings in Gasoline can easily be reconciled with the test, so providing further 
evidence that the test is only new in the sense that it was first explicitly endorsed in 
Tyres.   
 
In Gasoline, the United States had provided explanations for why it was not possible to 
align the treatment of domestic and imported gasoline such as to avoid the initial 
violation of GATT Article III:4.  Imported gasoline could not be granted the same 
treatment as domestic gasoline, because of administrative problems connected with 
verification of origin and enforcement actions.  Although this explanation was not 
linked to any particular part of the chapeau’s language, the United States effectively 
seemed to be arguing that the difference in treatment was not discriminatory under the 
chapeau, because it was not as ‘between countries where the same conditions prevail’.  
In other words, prevailing domestic conditions presented less difficulty, with respect to 
verification of origin and enforcement, than prevailing foreign conditions.  Such an 
argument would have corresponded with the perspectives noted above on what 
conditions should be selected when comparing prevailing conditions between countries.  
Conditions relating to the availability and reliability of information about gasoline from 
exporting countries would be pertinent to the policy objective of enhancing air quality.  
 
The Appellate Body responded by pointing towards the limited efforts by the United 
States to surmount these difficulties by entering into arrangements with foreign 
governments.  Therefore, the view was that alleged differences in prevailing conditions 
do not suffice to exonerate measures under the chapeau, and that the United States had 
failed to establish that these alleged differences actually existed.   
 
                                                 
37 An interesting query is why the United States devoted so much attention to persuading the Appellate 
Body of the merits of its suggested approach, when, upon its application, it only served the confirm the 
presence of unjustifiable discrimination.  The answer probably relates to the distinction between the 
measure itself, and the manner of its application.  Had the Appellate Body concentrated more on the 
measure itself, rather than (as required by the chapeau) the measure’s application, it is entirely possible 
that the measure would have been exonerated.   It was noted (at para. 161) that,  
 
[A]s enacted by the Congress of the United States, the statutory provisions of Section 
609(b)(2)(A) and (B) do not, in themselves, require that other WTO Members adopt 
essentially the same policies and enforcement practices as the United States. Viewed alone, 
the statute appears to permit a degree of discretion or flexibility in how the standards for 
determining comparability might be applied, in practice, to other countries.  However, any 
flexibility that may have been intended by Congress when it enacted the statutory provision 
has been effectively eliminated in the implementation of that policy through the 1996 
Guidelines promulgated by the Department of State and through the practice of the 
administrators in making certification determinations. 
 
The suggested approach / new test can now be applied.  If we concentrate on the measure itself, the 
discretion to accept the importation of shrimp caught with methods comparable to those mandated in 
the United States can be emphasized.  Under the measure itself, the only reason for discriminating 
against shrimp from some countries would then be that these shrimp were actually caught in a manner 
detrimental to sea turtles.  This reason clearly has a direct and strong connection to the policy objective.  
38 Brazil – Tyres, para. 228. 
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It can quickly be appreciated how the Tyres approach could be applied here to reach 
the same result of a failure to meet the terms of the chapeau.  The primary explanation 
for the discrimination was the unsubstantiated claim about difficulties with verification 
and enforcement.  There is no ‘rational connection’ between this explanation and the 
environmental policy objective, since the unsubstantiated claims do not support the 
policy objective to any extent at all.  In contrast, had the claims been substantiated, 
there would have been a connection between the explanation, and the policy objective.  
Subjecting foreign gasoline to the less favourable regime would have been a difficult 
situation to avoid, and would have been done in the name of conserving an exhaustible 
natural resource – clean air. 
 
V. CONTRASTING THE PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY APPROACHES 
  
As noted above, under the panel’s approach, measures can be exonerated under the 
chapeau based on a finding of limited trade effects, even if the explanation for the 
discrimination undermines the policy objective.  The Appellate Body’s alternative 
approach does not permit this possibility.  A finding that the discrimination undermines 
the policy objective will bring the chapeau analysis to an end without considering the 
possibly exonerating quality of limited trade effects.  As will now be explained, the 
absence of this independent test means that the Appellate Body has not attributed 
distinct meaning to the different phrases within the chapeau.  
 
By its formulation, the Appellate Body’s test (as set out above) is clearly intended to 
reveal only the ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’ nature of measures already found to have 
been applied in a discriminatory manner ‘between countries where the same conditions 
prevail’.  However, the Appellate Body’s test for the ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’ 
element, is the same as the panel’s test to determine whether the discrimination is 
‘between countries where the same conditions prevail’.  This point has already been 
illustrated twice in the discussion above.  In Gasoline, the United States argued that the 
chapeau was not breached because it was not possible to align the treatment of domestic 
and imported gasoline.  In explaining why this was not possible, the (unsuccessful) 
argument was effectively that prevailing conditions differed, so that there was a valid 
explanation for the discrimination connected with a recognized Article XX objective.  
It has also been explained that the panel in Tyres explicitly considered whether the 
discrimination resulting from the court injunctions occurred ‘between countries where 
the same conditions prevail’.  The panel’s positive finding here was effectively a 
finding of the absence of a valid explanation for the discrimination.       
 
It follows that, under the Appellate Body’s approach, once it is known that the 
discrimination is ‘unjustifiable’, it is also known whether there is discrimination 
‘between countries where the same conditions prevail’, and vice versa.  In contrast, the 
panel’s approach in Tyres has the relative advantage that distinct tests apply in the two 
areas.  Trade flows are considered only in connection with the ‘unjustifiable’ standard.  
Therefore, the panel’s approach could be depicted as more responsive to the need to 
‘give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty’ first recognized by the Appellate 
Body in Gasoline.39 However, this surely cannot be something which must be achieved 
even at the expense of introducing an unworkable test.  The panel’s approach could also 
be depicted as preserving more regulatory autonomy for WTO members, since the 
                                                 
39 United States – Gasoline, page 23. 
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additional test provides an extra opportunity for measures to be exonerated under the 
chapeau.  However, the inherent uncertainty of considering trade flows only preserves 
additional regulatory autonomy in a very limited and unpredictable sense which is 
outside the control of governments.  
 
In any event, there seems to be little wrong in principle with thinking about the chapeau 
as posing the single question of when there is ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail’, and deciding this question with 
a single test.  Something which might cast doubt on this provisional conclusion, 
however, is if the Appellate Body’s approach were to blur certain boundaries in the 
Treaty text with objectionable consequences.    
 
VI. Blurring the Article XX Internal Boundary Between Provisional Justification and 
the Chapeau 
 
The concern which prevented the Appellate Body from openly acknowledging its 
approach towards the chapeau was the risk of blurring the boundary within Article XX 
between provisional justification and the chapeau.40 An indistinct boundary here could 
be presented as a reason for preferring the panel’s approach under which the level of 
trade effects would be decisive only under the chapeau.  The precise sense in which the 
Appellate Body’s approach blurs the Article XX internal boundary therefore needs to 
be explored.  It will be shown that the applicable tests in the two areas may well be the 
same.  However, the same tests will not very often actually be applied to the same 
measure, both under provisional justification and the chapeau.  In the occasional 
instances when this occurs, the chapeau analysis would be unlikely to add anything to 
the provisional justification analysis, thereby blurring the internal boundary in a real 
sense.  However, it is argued that the effect is to preserve regulatory autonomy, without 
creating an overly permissive environment.    
 
A. THE SAME TESTS UNDER PROVISIONAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE 
CHAPEAU 
 
How then could the applicable tests in the two areas be the same?  It can first be 
explained why this possibility does not emerge clearly from Tyres itself.  Neither of the 
reasons for the discrimination (the MERCOSUR exemption and the court injunctions) 
was found to bear any relationship to the legitimate objective pursued by the import 
ban.  On the contrary, the public health objective was actually undermined by these 
reasons.  The Article XX internal boundary was therefore blurred, only to the limited 
extent that the content of the heads of provisional justification needed to be borne in 
mind when dismissing the reasons for the discrimination as invalid.   
 
However, in different cases, where the reason for the discrimination supports the policy 
goal to at least some extent,41 the question becomes that of how compelling the 
connection needs to be.  By analogy with the case law on the ‘necessary’ requirement 
                                                 
40 This is clear from para. 149 of United States - Shrimp set out in Section IV above. 
41 An example of such a situation can be provided by referring to the analysis of the Gasoline case 
provided in the main text above.  Had the claims about difficulties with verification and enforcement 
been substantiated, there would have been at least a connection between the explanation for the 
discrimination, and the policy objective.  It would then have been necessary to assess whether the 
required ‘rational connection’ was present. 
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in some of the heads of provisional justification, the required extent of the connection 
could vary depending on the importance of the public policy goal at issue.42 It would 
be easier to establish the required connection when, for example, the policy goal is to 
protect human life, as opposed to plant health.  In sum, where the reason for the 
discrimination supports the policy goal to at least some extent, the evaluation of 
whether the required ‘rational connection’ is present, is likely to bear a resemblance to 
the provisional justification analysis.  This blurs the Article XX internal boundary, more 
than the situation in which there is absolutely no connection between the explanation 
for the discrimination and the policy goal.   
 
It is possible to interpret a rather cryptic passage in the Brazil – Tyres report as hinting 
towards these ideas.  Having dismissed the Panel’s effects based approach, the 
Appellate Body proceeded as follows: 
 
Having said that, we recognize that in certain cases the effects of the 
discrimination may be a relevant factor, among others, for determining 
whether the cause or rationale of the discrimination is acceptable or 
defensible and, ultimately, whether the discrimination is justifiable.43  
 
How does this passage relate to the test for detecting unjustifiable discrimination?  We 
know, from the new test, that the ‘cause or rationale of the discrimination’ will be 
‘acceptable or defensible’ when it has a rational connection with a recognized policy 
objective.  Therefore, what needs to be identified is a situation when the consideration 
of trade effects, can assist in identifying this rational connection.  Might the Appellate 
Body be alluding to a ‘weighing and balancing’ exercize of the kind associated with 
provisional justification under the ‘necessary’ requirement?44 If the reasons for the 
discrimination support the policy goal to at least some extent, this might need to be 
weighed against the restrictive trade effects of the discrimination.  Whether the required 
‘rational connection’ exists, might then depend on the outcome of such a weighing and 
balancing exercize, during which, trade effects are placed in the negative side of the 
balance.  If this is what the Appellate Body intended to say, why did it not do so in 
clearer terms?  Perhaps the answer is that it did not wish to be seen to be blurring the 
Article XX internal boundary, in a case in which it was not necessary to do so to any 
significant extent. 
 
1. Cost-Benefit Balancing Under the Chapeau? 
                                                 
42 This idea was first expressed by the Appellate Body in Korea – Beef , para. 162 in the context of 
Article XX(d).  In European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted 5 April 2001) which involved Article XX(b), the original 
statement was generalized so that ‘[t]he more vital or important [the] common interests or values 
pursued, the easier it would be to accept as “necessary” measures designed to achieve those ends.’ 
(para. 172). 
43 Brazil – Tyres, para. 230. 
44 In its review of the panel’s provisional justification analysis, the Appellate Body in Tyres described 
this exercize by quoting from its findings in United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted 20 April 2005) para. 143: 
…the weighing and balancing process inherent in the necessity analysis ‘begins with an 
assessment of the “relative importance” of the interests or values furthered by the 
challenged measure’, and also involves an assessment of other factors, which will usually 
include ‘the contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it’ and 
‘the restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce’.  
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It is interesting to add a few observations here about how the views expressed above 
correspond with the debate about the meaning of the term ‘necessary’ in some of the 
heads of provisional justification.  In a recent contribution, Regan argues that the 
Appellate Body has not engaged in cost-benefit balancing (frequently also referred to 
as proportionality strictu sensu) despite the ‘weighing and balancing’ language used to 
describe the process of applying the necessity test.45 His view is that the test has been 
equated with the less invasive question of whether there is a less-restrictive alternative 
which would achieve the desired level of protection to the same extent as the chosen 
measure, but with a lesser cost in terms of reduced trade.46  If this question is answered 
in the negative, the measures should be provisionally justified, without being subjected 
to the further test of whether the benefits of the measure are outweighed by its costs in 
terms of reduced trade.  Under this test, the state may be required to adopt a measure 
that is less restrictive of trade, even if this measure does not fully achieve the desired 
level of protection of the legitimate interests.    
 
If the reader’s preferred view is that WTO tribunals should not engage in such 
balancing, there is a way to interpret the cryptic passage above in a way which avoids 
any implication of balancing under the chapeau.  The passage should be read as 
indicating that trade effects are relevant under the chapeau, for whatever reason/s they 
are relevant under the necessity test in provisional justification.  Trade effects are of 
course relevant to the less-restrictive alternative test since, in order to apply the test, 
one needs to know how trade restrictive the chosen measure is.  This approach can be 
carried over to the chapeau in cases where (unlike Tyres) the reason for the 
discrimination supports the policy objective to at least some extent.  Whether the 
required ‘rational connection’ is present might depend on whether there is a less-
restrictive alternative.  We would need to know the relative trade restrictiveness of the 
chosen measure, and the possible alternatives, to apply this test.  On the other hand, 
those in favour of cost-benefit balancing could emphasize the need to distinguish the 
chapeau analysis from the provisional justification analysis.  Measures found to be 
necessary during provisional justification based on the non-availability of a less-
restrictive alternative, could still fail a cost-benefit test under the chapeau.47 However, 
the value in maintaining a clear distinction between the two analyses is a rather small 
point when weighted with the formidable arguments against judicial cost-benefit 
balancing.48 
                                                 
45 See Donald Regan, The Meaning of ‘Necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The 
Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 World Trade Review 3 (2007) 347-369.       
46 This view seems to be confirmed by the Appellate Body’s statements in Tyres.  It was noted that 
possible alternatives must not only be less trade restrictive than the chosen measure, ‘but should 
preserve for the responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to 
the objective pursued’. See paras 156 and 170. 
47 It is informative here to mention the view that the chapeau can be interpreted as embodying 
proportionality stricto sensu on the basis that Article 30 second sentence of the EC Treaty uses the 
same language as the chapeau, and has occasionally been interpreted by the European Court of Justice 
as a full proportionality principle.  The prevailing view is that this approach should not be carried over 
to the WTO context.  See Jam Neumann and Elisabeth TÜrk, Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in 
World Trade Organization Law After Korea-Beef, EC-Asbestos and EC Sardines, 37 Journal of World 
Trade 1 (2003) 199-233 at 205-206.    
48 There are perhaps four types of argument against balancing.  First, there is little in the WTO texts 
which provides a mandate for balancing, and it is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the 
relevant Treaty terms.  Secondly, it has been argued with reference to economic theory that balancing 
is not required in order to give virtual representation to the voice of foreign producers which are lost in 
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B. ACTUAL APPLICATION OF THE SAME TESTS 
 
It has now been demonstrated how the applicable tests in the two areas may well be the 
same so that the second introductory point can now be recalled.  The same tests will not 
very often actually be applied to the same measure, both under provisional justification 
and the chapeau.  The most obvious reason for this is that the analysis may not proceed 
beyond provisional justification.  Another reason is illustrated by Tyres, in which 
entirely different aspects of the challenged measure (or, arguably, different measures) 
were addressed in the two different parts of the Article XX analysis.  At issue during 
provisional justification was the necessity of the import ban.  In contrast, during the 
chapeau analysis, the MERCOSUR exemption and the injunctions were presented as 
aspects of the application of the import ban.49  Therefore, even if there had been some 
connection between the reasons for the discrimination and the policy objective, and, 
even if something resembling a necessity type test had been applied to check for the 
required ‘rational connection’, this analysis would not have been a repeat of the 
provisional justification analysis. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a scenario in which the same tests could actually be applied in 
both parts of the Article XX analysis, thereby blurring the internal boundary in a real 
sense.  This would occur in the situation where a measure is considered to be necessary 
during provisional justification, and also exonerated under the chapeau using the same 
reasoning.  Here, the provisional justification and chapeau analyses would merge into 
one.  The measure is not subject to additional legal standards under the chapeau, over 
and above those applied during provisional justification.  In a round about way, 
Gasoline provides an illustration of this possibility.50     
 
Based on the way the case was actually decided, a clear boundary was maintained 
within the two parts of the Article XX analysis.  The United States failed to 
provisionally justify the measure under Article XX(b) as being ‘necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health’, and did not invite the Appellate Body to examine 
the panel’s findings here.  Also, the Appellate Body’s findings that the measure could 
be provisionally justified under Article XX(g), but ultimately fell foul of the chapeau, 
did not blur the Article XX boundary.  There was still something fresh to say under the 
chapeau, having found (under Article XX(g)) that the measure was related ‘to the 
                                                 
the domestic political process.  Global efficiency can be achieved merely through enquiry into the 
domestic rationality of the trade measure; a process which does not implicate balancing.  In respect of 
both these perspectives, see Regan, as note 45 above.  The third argument is that balancing can only 
acceptably occur against a background of strong democratic legitimacy which the WTO presently 
lacks.  See J Neumann and E TÜrk, as note 47 above at 231-233.  Finally, it is difficult for international 
courts to have at their disposal sufficient factual information to perform the quantitative analysis 
associated with cost-benefit balancing.  It has been noted that, ‘…in many cases the ECJ, although it 
has sufficient legitimacy, exercises judicial self-restraint and leaves the final decision on whether the 
measure satisfies the proportionality standard to the national court.’ Panagiotis Delimatsis, Determining 
the Necessity of Domestic Regulations in Services The Best is Yet to Come, 19 European Journal of 
International Law 2 (2008) 365-408 at 390.     
49 This situation is not unique.  There is an analogy here with United States – Gambling where the 
prohibition on the remote supply of gambling services was considered during provisional justification, 
and the possible permissibility of such gambling under the Inter State Horseracing Act (IHA) was 
considered under the chapeau.   
50 A further illustration relating to an alternative conception of the primary violation analysis in Brazil – 
Tyres is provided below.  See the discussion which culminates with note 76.   
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conservation of exhaustible natural resources, and ‘made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic consumption.’ 
 
However, in connection with the Article XX(b) analysis, what if the panel, having 
decided that the measure was not ‘necessary’, had chosen also to analyse it under the 
chapeau?51 Alternatively, what if the panel had decided that the measure was 
‘necessary’ under Article XX(b)?  It would then, of course, have proceeded to the 
chapeau.  In respect of both questions, would there have been anything more to say 
under the chapeau, that had not already been covered under Article XX(b)? 
 
The short answer here is that the chapeau analysis would have strongly resembled the 
provisional justification analysis under Article XX(b).  As noted, the Appellate Body’s 
analysis moved from provisional justification under Article XX(g), to the chapeau.  
However, its chapeau analysis draws on the panel’s reasoning while discussing 
provisional justification under Article XX(b).  In its analysis of the ‘necessary’ 
requirement in Article XX(b), the panel examined ‘…whether there were measures 
consistent or less inconsistent with the General Agreement that were reasonably 
available to the United States to further its policy objectives of protecting human, 
animal and plant life or health.’52 One of the key findings here was that: 
 
…the United States had reasonably available to it data for, and measures of, 
verification and assessment which were consistent or less inconsistent with 
Article III:4. For instance, although foreign data may be formally less 
subject to complete control by US authorities, this did not amount to 
establishing that foreign data could not in any circumstances be sufficiently 
reliable to serve U.S. purposes.53  
 
This was part of several passages from the panel report set out by the Appellate Body.  
The point which needs to be emphasized, however, is that the panel’s findings within 
its provisional justification analysis, were cited by the Appellate Body within its 
chapeau analysis.54  In other words, the main reason for the ‘unjustifiable’ nature of the 
discrimination under the chapeau, (being the failure to substantiate the claim of 
administrative problems connected with verification of origin) was also the main reason 
that the measure was not ‘necessary’ under Article XX(b).  While the panel and 
Appellate reports are internally coherent, they do not map very well with each other, at 
least if there is value in having something different to say in each part of the overall 
analysis.  Had the United States demonstrated the existence of insurmountable 
difficulties with verification, it seems likely that the measure would have been both 
‘necessary’ under Article XX(b), and would have satisfied the chapeau.       
                                                 
51 The Appellate Body noted in United States – Gambling that there is no ‘requirement on panels to 
stop evaluating a responding party's defence once they have determined that a challenged measure is 
not provisionally justified under one of the paragraphs of the general exception provision.’ (para. 343) 
52 United States – Gasoline, panel report, para. 6.25.  Admittedly, the panel analyzed the ‘necessary’ 
requirement with reference to the ‘less restrictive alternative’ test, rather than by conducting a 
‘weighing and balancing’ exercise.  However, the former articulation of the approach towards the term 
‘necessary’ can overlap just as much with the approach to the chapeau in Brazil – Tyres, as the latter 
articulation.  Whether the required ‘rational connection’ between the explanation for the discrimination 
and the policy objective is present, could be determined by asking whether a less trade restrictive 
alternative to the selected measure is reasonably available.    
53 Ibid., para. 6.28. 
54 United States – Gasoline, Appellate Body report, pages 26-27. 
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This possibility of an indistinct boundary is advantageous in the sense that it preserves 
regulatory autonomy.  The view that too much autonomy would be preserved, to the 
extent of depriving the chapeau of its role in guarding against abuse of the exceptions, 
can be met with the following response.  Even with this concern in mind, it is possible 
to remain sanguine about the strong parallels within the Article XX analysis when the 
case comes to the chapeau via paragraph (b), and its ‘necessary’ requirement.  The 
‘necessary’ requirement is more difficult to satisfy than the ‘relating to’ requirement in 
Article XX(g).  It, therefore, plays a strong role in guarding against the abuse of the 
paragraph (b) exception.  To put this point in a slightly different way, the protection 
against abuse of the exception is internal to the exception, so that the chapeau does not 
need to have as strong a role.55 A final point which flows logically from the analysis 
above is that, in order for measures to be exonerated under Article XX(g), they must 
not only relate ‘to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources’, but must also be 
necessary under the chapeau.56 Article XX(g) might just as well state that measures 
must be necessary for the conservation objective.57  
    
In sum, therefore, it seems that the Appellate Body’s new found sanguinity towards the 
possible problem of blurring the Article XX internal boundary is justified.  The worse 
case scenario is that the chapeau analysis could strongly resemble the provisional 
justification analysis.  However, this situation does not arise at all in cases where 
different aspects of the measure are examined in the different parts of Article XX.  
Where the problem does arise, it seems neither to curtail regulatory autonomy, nor to 
create too permissive an environment.   
 
VII. THE CLARITY OF THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE PRIMARY 
VIOLATION AND CHAPEAU ANALYSES 
 
 
The implications of the Appellate Body’s approach for what may be a more important 
boundary – that between the primary violation and chapeau analyses – can now be more 
fully considered.  The need for a clear distinction between the two analyses was recognized 
by the Appellate Body in United States – Gasoline.  To conflate the primary violation 
and chapeau analyses, ‘…would be both to empty the chapeau of its contents and to 
deprive the exceptions in paragraphs (a) to (j) of meaning.’ This ‘…would also confuse 
the question of whether inconsistency with a substantive rule existed, with the further 
                                                 
55 Brazil – Tyres seems to contradict this suggestion.  While the measure was necessary, the chapeau 
still had a strong role to play.  Of course, the explanation for this has already been referred to in the 
main text.  This was a case in which completely different aspects of the measure (or, arguably, different 
measures) were examined in the different parts of Article XX.  In such cases, there is both little risk of 
blurring the internal boundary, and the chapeau is likely to retain a strong role.  
56 For further discussion of whether the Appellate Body’s reasoning in Gasoline introduces a necessity 
requirement into the chapeau, see Neumann and TÜrk, as note 47 above at 227-228 and references 
cited therein.  
57 It is possible that this point may have been appreciated by the drafters of the Canada – Peru Bilateral 
Investment Treaty.  The language used in Article 10 – the General Exceptions provision – is clearly 
inspired by GATT Article XX.  However, all three heads of provisional justification are preceded by 
the term ‘necessary’.  The agreement can be viewed through this gateway: 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx    
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and separate question arising under the chapeau of Article XX as to whether that 
inconsistency was nevertheless justified.’58  
 
The analysis here will proceed in several stages.  First, it will be considered whether   
the emphasis in the chapeau on the manner in which measures are ‘applied’, provides a 
means of distinguishing the primary violation and chapeau analyses.  It will be argued 
that this is an illusory basis for maintaining the distinction, and it will be questioned 
whether more convincing techniques are evident in the case law.   Particular attention 
will be given to the technique used in Tyres, which involved evaluating completely 
different measures in the primary violation and chapeau analyses.  The view that the 
measures evaluated under the chapeau ought to have been evaluated as independent 
primary violations will be addressed, and it will be questioned what implications this 
alternative analysis would have had for the clarity of the primary violation / chapeau 
boundary.  It is argued that, even under this alternative analysis, the ‘new’ chapeau test 
does not lead to an indistinct boundary.   
 
A. THE EMPHASIS ON THE MANNER IN WHICH MEASURES ARE ‘APPLIED’ 
 
By its express terms, the chapeau is concerned with the way in which measures are 
‘applied’, and the Appellate Body has often drawn attention to this language.  In 
Shrimp, for example, it was noted that the chapeau can be breached ‘where a measure, 
otherwise fair and just on its face, is actually applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable 
manner.’59  
 
Whether this emphasis provides a means of distinguishing the primary violation and 
chapeau analyses depends, in the first instance, on what analytical techniques are 
adopted under the pretext of focusing on application under the chapeau.  Thus in Tyres, 
the MERCOSUR exemption and court injunctions were regarded as aspects of the 
application of the import ban, and evaluated only under the chapeau, thereby 
maintaining a distinct boundary.  While this approach is discussed further in the next 
section, the comments below relate to the situation where what can realistically be 
regarded as the same measure is evaluated both in the primary violation and under the 
chapeau.    
 
In this situation, the relevant enquiry is whether matters relating to application can be 
excluded from the primary violation analysis.  However, such exclusion can only be 
made where the violation is plain from the face of the measure.  To put this point 
differently, the statement from Shrimp is almost a non-sequitur.  If the measure is ‘fair 
and just’ on its face, and the manner of its application is not considered in the primary 
violation analysis, then there would surely not be a primary violation.60 The possibility 
that the chapeau’s focus on application provides a means to establish a distinct 
boundary, can be further dispelled in two ways, the first of which is generally 
understood, while the second has emerged from Gambling.   
                                                 
58 United States – Gasoline, Appellate Body report, page.23. 
59 United States - Shrimp, para. 161. 
60 The only means to avoid the interpretation of a non-sequitur is to concede that the manner of 
application is considered in both the primary violation and chapeau analyses, but that the chapeau is 
concerned with a search for more egregious aspects of the application than the primary violation.  
However, this leads to the artificial situation of keeping something in reserve to consider under the 
chapeau, which could just as well be considered in the primary violation.  
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The general point relates to a well-established position in WTO jurisprudence. 
Legislation which is discretionary in character, in the sense that it is capable of being 
applied in either a WTO consistent manner, or a WTO inconsistent manner, cannot 
ordinarily itself be challenged with a view to eradicating the discretion for inconsistent 
application.  Only individual instances of the inconsistent application of the legislation 
can be challenged.61 Therefore, the analysis under the primary violation might need to 
focus on the manner in which a measure is applied.   
 
In Gambling, the Appellate Body reiterated that, ‘[T]he focus of the chapeau, by its 
express terms, is on the application of a measure already found by the Panel to be 
inconsistent with one of the obligations under the GATS but falling within one of the 
paragraphs of Article XIV.’62 Elements of the application of the enactments were then 
considered in terms of whether they had been enforced in a discriminatory manner.  
Clearly, therefore, the starting point was indeed the way in which the enactments had 
been applied.  However, the evidence relating to enforcement was found to be 
inconclusive, and the Appellate Body fell back on the face of the enactments which 
were non-discriminatory.63 The lack of persuasiveness of the evidence presented, meant 
that the enactments themselves were decisive, rather than the manner of their 
application.     
 
In sum, the manner in which a discretionary measure is applied may be decisive in the 
primary violation analysis, just as the measure itself may be decisive in the chapeau 
analysis, as in Gambling.  The question of whether more convincing techniques have 
been used to separate the two analyses can now be addressed.  
 
B. MAINTAINING THE BOUNDARY IN GASOLINE, GAMBLING AND TYRES 
 
In United States – Gasoline, the risk of blurring the boundary between the primary 
violation and chapeau analyses was especially pronounced, by reason of discrimination 
in the form of national treatment violations in both areas.  However, an indistinct 
boundary was avoided by considering distinct issues in the two areas.  The panel was 
easily able to find an Article III:4 national treatment violation by observing that the 
scheme could prevent the sale of imported gasoline which was chemically identical to 
domestic gasoline which could permissibly be sold.64 This finding can be thought of as 
the departure point for the Appellate Body’s chapeau analysis which proceeded to 
question whether there were valid and convincing reasons for the discrimination.65 The 
two analyses were distinctive in the sense that only under the chapeau was there any 
enquiry into the possibly exonerating quality of explanations for the discrimination.   
  
                                                 
61 See Yoshiko Naiki, The Mandatory / Discretionary Doctrine in WTO Law, 7 Journal of International 
Economic Law 1 (2004), 23-72; Kwan Kiat Sim, Rethinking the Mandatory / Discretionary Legislation 
Distinction in WTO Jurisprudence, 2 World Trade Review 1 (2003). 33-64. 
62 United States – Gambling, para. 339. 
63 The same pattern was repeated in respect of the IHA.  This enactment authorized domestic, but not 
foreign, service suppliers to offer remote betting services on certain horse races.  The United States 
argued that this civil statute could not impliedly repeal earlier criminal statutes, but both the panel and 
Appellate Body found the evidence presented to be inconclusive.  Therefore, the Appellate Body again 
fell back on the face of the IHA, which, on this occasion, was plainly discriminatory.   
64 United States – Gasoline, panel report, para. 6.10.   
65 This point is discussed above – presently p. 15. 
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The risk of an indistinct boundary is lessened still further in cases where completely 
different measures are considered in the two analyses, and in cases where the same 
measures are evaluated in the two areas, but for different purposes.  The Gambling case 
is illustrative of both points.  In respect of the latter point, the challenged enactments 
were found to be primary violations of GATS Article XVI, the Market Access 
provision.  Under the chapeau, however, the same enactments were evaluated for the 
different purpose of checking for discrimination in the form of national treatment 
violations.66 In respect of the former point, the chapeau analysis also involved 
considering an enactment which was not considered in the primary violation – the 
Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA).   
 
Brazil – Tyres can be depicted both as a case where completely different measures were 
considered in the two areas, or as a case in which the same measure was evaluated, but 
for different purposes.   The case falls within the second category based on the way it 
was actually decided.  As noted above, the import ban was analysed under Article XI.  
In contrast, the MERCOSUR exception, and the court injunctions, were regarded as 
aspects of the application of the import ban, and were considered primarily in the 
chapeau analysis.  The different purpose here was to check for most favoured nation 
and national treatment violations.   In the present author’s view, the case fits more 
naturally under the first category (completely different measures) since it is a rather 
strained interpretation to think of the selective non-application of an import ban as 
aspects of the application of the ban.  The chapeau’s focus on application ought not to 
be pushed this far as a means of distinguishing the primary violation and chapeau 
analyses.      
 
C. MAINTAINING THE BOUNDARY IN TYRES UNDER A DIFFERENT 
CONCEPTION OF THE PRIMARY VIOLATION 
 
What if the MERCOSUR exception and court injunctions had been analyzed, not under 
the chapeau as aspects of the application of the import ban, but as independent primary 
violations, respectively of Article I, and Article III:4?  What impact would this have 
had on the clarity of the primary violation, and chapeau boundary? In the days following 
the publication of the Appellate Body’s report, the initial view that this alternative 
                                                 
66 The analysis here could be taken further by asking whether the primary violation analysis in 
Gambling was flawed, and, if so, what implications this might have had for the clarity of the primary 
violation / chapeau boundary.  Regan has argued that the Appellate Body mistakenly found an Article 
XVI Market Access violation in its primary violation analysis (Donald Regan, A Gambling Paradox: 
Why an origin-Neutral ‘Zero-Quota’ is Not a Quota Under GATS Article XVI, 41 Journal of World 
Trade 6 (2007), 1297-1317).  The view that there was no market access violation, raises the possibility 
that the primary violation analysis ought to have centred on GATS Article XVII, the national treatment 
provision, especially as the United States had not inscribed any limitation on national treatment in the 
gambling sector.  Had this occurred, the chapeau analysis would surely have appeared in the Article 
XVII primary violation analysis.  In most respects, this would have been unproblematic since most of 
the enactments did not amount to national treatment violations, thereby removing the need for recourse 
to the Article XIV General Exceptions.  In other words, most of the enactments would have been 
exonerated under the national treatment primary violation analysis, for the same reasons they were 
exonerated under the chapeau.  In contrast, however, the IHA would likely have amounted to a primary 
violation for the same reasons it was found to fall foul of the chapeau.  From this position, it would be 
easy to commit the error of pointing towards the absence of any boundary between the primary 
violation and chapeau analyses.  However, the error here would be to forget the intermediate stage of 
provisional justification.  The analysis would not have reached the chapeau because by no stretch of the 
imagination could the explicit discrimination in the IHA be, ‘necessary to protect public morals’.  
 25 
primary violation analysis would have collapsed the boundary was expressed,67 thereby 
providing a reason for favouring the panel’s approach.  A contrary view is proposed 
here. 
 
1. The MERCOSUR Exemption as an Independent Violation 
 
It is notable that both Brazil and the European Communities considered the import ban, 
and the MERCOSUR exemption, to be ‘distinct legal instruments’ requiring separate 
analysis.68 Also notable is that the Appellate Body criticized the panel for not 
examining the separate claim of an Article I violation.69 Had there been a separate 
analysis, there is little doubt that the MERCOSUR exemption would have been found 
to violate Article I, since this was conceded by Brazil.  On the other hand, it is highly 
unlikely that the analysis would have proceeded as far as the chapeau of Article XX.  
Even if it had, the chapeau analysis would have differed from the Article I analysis.   
 
It is first arguable that Article XX ought to be regarded as completely irrelevant as a 
possible means of justifying this particular Article I violation.  The exemption was 
connected with regional integration, to the extent that it was introduced in order to 
implement the findings of an ad hoc MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal.  As such, the 
exemption ought to have been evaluated under Article XXIV only, this being the most 
relevant provision.70 The Panel would have needed to grapple with the relationship 
between paragraphs 5 and 8 of Article XXIV.  One of the most pressing issues might 
have been whether, and how, to apply the Appellate Body’s test from Turkey – Textiles 
to the effect that the permissibility of the measure (the MERCOSUR exemption) 
depends on whether the formation of the customs union would have been prevented if 
Brazil were not allowed to introduce the measure.71 Had this test been applied,72 it is 
                                                 
67 This view was expressed in a thought provoking contribution to the International Economic Law and 
Policy Blog posted by Julia Qin on 4 December 2007.  This contribution, and others by leading 
commentators can be viewed at http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2007/12/ab-in-tyres-
and.html as of 10 June 2008. 
68 This is clear from their responses to the Panel’s Question 131.  However, for reasons which are not 
obvious, by the time of the appeal, the European Communities had come to regard the import ban and 
the exemption as ‘two aspects of a single measure’.  Brazil – Tyres, Appellate Body report, para. 125. 
69 Ibid. paras 253-257. 
70 This view was favoured by the European Communities.  See Brazil – Tyres, panel report, para. 
4.382. 
71 Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R (adopted 19 
November 1999), para. 58.  This is the second of the two tests in Turkey – Textiles; the first being that 
the measure is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully meets various provisions in 
Article XXIV.  In its Question 78, in Brazil – Tyres, the panel asked the European Communities 
whether it was of the view that, ‘…no measure adopted by parties to a customs union after its 
formation could ever be justified under Article XXIV.’ The European Communities responded that the 
formation process was typically ‘gradual’ in nature so that, ‘a measure may also be regarded as adopted 
on the formation of the customs union if it is adopted at a later point than the initial formation of a 
customs union, provided it is necessary for the formation of the customs union, and is adopted within a 
reasonable period of time’.  The European Communities went on to argue that these conditions were 
not satisfied here. 
72 This caveat is added as it is arguable that this test ought not to be applied in this case.  The panel in 
United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures Against Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe 
from Korea, WT/DS202/R, distinguished Turkey – Textiles in these terms:    
 
Turkey – Textiles concerned the imposition by a member of a customs union of restrictive 
measures against imports from a third country, upon the formation of that customs union. 
Clearly, if members of a customs union seek to introduce restrictive measures against imports 
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possible that it would not have been satisfied since Article XXIV:8 does not require the 
elimination of ‘restrictive regulations of commerce’ within a customs union in so far as 
they are ‘necessary’ under Article XX.  In other words, so far as the WTO rules are 
concerned, MERCOSUR can still be recognized as a customs union even if trade 
restrictions are maintained within the region on health grounds.73 
 
Had the panel dealt with the MERCOSUR exemption as a separate violation, Brazil – 
Tyres might have generated some authoritative guidance on Article XXIV.  The issues 
which were avoided are of tremendous importance to the balance between regional and 
multilateral liberalization.  At the same time, however, they are not of direct relevance 
to maintaining the boundary between the primary violation and chapeau analyses.  The 
view which needs to be reiterated is that the exemption should have stood or fallen 
based on Article XXIV, thereby removing the possibility of blurring the boundary now 
under examination.  However, the parties also presented arguments based on Article 
XX(d) as a possible means of justifying the Article I violation.74 Had the analysis 
moved from the primary violation of Article I, to provisional justification under Article 
XX(d), would the chapeau of Article XX have come into play?   
 
In order for measures to be provisionally justified under Article XX(d), they must be, 
‘necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to … the prevention of 
deceptive practices.’ What is most striking about Brazil’s reliance on this exception, is 
the distance between the situation in Tyres, and a paradigm case.  The provision is most 
immediately associated with the Korea – Beef case, where Korea argued 
(unsuccessfully) that the separation of domestic and imported beef at the point of sale 
was necessary to prevent the deception of consumers via the practice of passing off 
imported beef, as the more expensive domestic beef.  To generalize, this was a case 
about the government enforcing its GATT consistent domestic laws, dealing with the 
prevention of deceptive practices, against economic operators.  In contrast, Tyres 
involved the government itself complying with its MERCOSUR based obligation to 
implement the ruling of the ad hoc tribunal.  While Brazil can be thought to be 
                                                 
from third countries, contrary to GATT 1994, it is entirely appropriate that they should be 
required to demonstrate the necessity of such measures. That being said, we are not at all 
convinced that an identical approach should be taken in cases where the alleged violation of 
GATT 1994 arises from the elimination of ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce’ between parties to a free-trade area, which is the very raison d'être of any free-
trade area. If the alleged violation of GATT 1994 forms part of the elimination of ‘duties and 
other restrictive regulations of commerce’, there can be no question of whether it is necessary 
for the elimination of ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce’.  Para. 7.148 
(emphasis in original). 
 
It is also arguable, however, that the panel’s views in United States – Line Pipe are not as apposite 
to the situation in Brazil – Tyres, as they are in the safeguards context.  A regional grouping cannot 
be recognized as a customs union under Article XXIV:8 if safeguard measures can be imposed on 
the internal trade.  In contrast, a customs union is not prevented from being recognized as such under 
this provision, merely because restrictions necessary under Article XX are maintained.  The 
European Communities made comparable submissions which the Brazil - Tyres panel set out in 
paras. 4.413-4.420.   
73 The Brazil - Tyres panel set out the exchange of arguments between the parties on this point at paras 
4.421-4.422. 
74 Brazil – Tyres panel report paras 4.425-4.448.   
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complying with its obligations, the notion of securing compliance, implies action by 
the government against operators.75  
 
The panel would have had to engage with this issue, and others, in order to decide on 
the availability, in principle, of the paragraph (d) exception so that the case would have 
tested the limits of this provision.  This reinforces the view that the MERCOSUR 
exemption should have been considered only under Article XXIV which, in contrast, is 
obviously and directly relevant.  Let us imagine, however, both the ‘in principle’ 
availability of Article XX(d), and the satisfaction of its necessity test.  The chapeau 
would then have come into play.  Had the Appellate Body’s conception of the chapeau 
been applied, would this have meant that the chapeau analysis would merely have 
repeated the primary violation analysis? Would the MERCOSUR exemption have 
fallen foul of the chapeau, for the same reasons as established the Article I primary 
violation?  
 
The position would have been quite the contrary, to the extent that the MERCOSUR 
exemption would have been exonerated under the chapeau.  The ‘new’ chapeau test is 
whether the reasons given for the discrimination bear a rational connection to the 
objective falling within the purview of a paragraph of Article XX.  The objective is now 
to secure compliance with GATT consistent laws or regulations under paragraph (d); 
in casu implementing the ruling of the MERCOSUR tribunal.  We can be certain that 
the ‘rational connection’ standard in the chapeau would have been met, as the necessity 
of the measure would first have been established in the provisional justification 
analysis.76           
 
To sum up, had the MERCOSUR exemption been analysed as a separate violation of 
Article I, there does not seem to be any risk at all of blurring the boundary between the 
primary violation and chapeau analyses.  The presence of such a risk would provide a 
small argument for preferring the panel’s effects based approach towards the chapeau.  
The risk does not however seem to be present, at least with respect to the MERCOSUR 
exemption. 
 
2. The Court Injunctions as an Independent Violation 
 
As noted above, the panel seemed to be of the view, during its chapeau analysis, that 
the court injunctions resulted in discrimination in the form of a national treatment 
violation.  Domestically produced retreaded tyres made from casings of European 
origin could be sold, while imported retreaded tyres made from the same casings could 
not be sold.  The panel therefore noted that, ‘the discrimination … arises between Brazil 
                                                 
75 This was the European Communities’ view of the scope of paragraph (d). See panel report para. 
4.440.  The same sentiment has been expressed by a panel which noted that, ‘to secure compliance’ 
means ‘to enforce compliance’ and that the ‘the notion of enforcement contains a concept of action 
within a hierarchical structure that is associated with the relation between the state and its subjects’. 
Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/R adopted 25 March 2006, 
paras 8.175 and 8.178. 
76 Of course, this means that the chapeau analysis would have added nothing to the provisional 
justification analysis.  However, this is a different boundary from that now under examination.  It has 
also been argued the blurring of the boundary within the chapeau is not problematic.  When a case 
comes to the chapeau via the necessity standard in provisional justification, the chapeau does not need 
to have a strong role in protecting against abuse of the exception.  The protection is internal to the 
exception itself. 
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and other WTO Members, including the European Communities.’77 This situation 
could have been analysed as an independent violation of Article III:4.78  The domestic 
and imported tyres are like in every respect other than their origin, and there is clearly 
less favourable treatment of the imported tyres.  Again, however, there does not seem 
to be any possibility here of the court injunctions failing to meet the terms of the 
chapeau, for the same reasons as established the primary violation.  This is simply 
because the analysis would not have proceeded beyond provisional justification under 
Article XX.  The importation of significant quantities of used tyres through the 
injunctions could not possibly be necessary to protect public health. 
 
It has therefore been demonstrated that the Appellate Body’s approach towards the 
chapeau does not create the danger of blurring the primary violation and chapeau 
analyses.  This point holds true regardless of which view about the number of 
independent primary violations is preferred, so that the Appellate Body’s original views 
about the sanctity of this boundary expressed in Gasoline remain unaffected.  However, 
it is necessary to highlight a possible development which, in combination with the 
‘new’ approach to the chapeau, could collapse the boundary.  
 
VIII. THE CHAPEAU TEST IN COMBINATION WITH THE EARLY 
CONSIDERATION OF REGULATORY PURPOSE  
 
As indicated in the introduction, the challenge facing an interpreter of the chapeau is to 
identify the nature of the discrimination which ought to be caught.  The answer which 
features as part of the panel’s reasoning, and which is the only test in the Appellate 
report, reflects formulations which have for some time been advocated in order to 
detect the discrimination with which the world trading order should be concerned.  
However, the crucial point for the present discussion is that calls for the adoption of 
what is now the chapeau test, have been made primarily in relation to national treatment 
primary violations.  The usual recommendation here is that the possibly exonerating 
quality of explanations for the alleged discrimination should be considered within the 
primary violation analysis itself.79 Endorsing this approach would undoubtedly 
‘…confuse the question of whether inconsistency with a substantive rule existed, with 
the further and separate question arising under the chapeau of Article XX as to whether 
that inconsistency was nevertheless justified.’80 To what extent is this concern offset 
                                                 
77 Brazil – Tyres, panel report para. 7.308, provided in Section II. 
78 It is notable, however, that, unlike the MERCOSUR exemption, there was no discussion of the 
possibility of treating the court injunctions as an independent violation in either the panel or Appellate 
Body reports.  
79 This idea is most closely associated with the work of Robert Hudec.  See, GATT / WTO Constraints 
on National Regulation: Requiem for an ‘Aims and Effects Test’ 32 The International Lawyer 3 (1998), 
619-649.  The idea has perhaps been most fully explored in Regan’s work.  See, for example, 
Regulatory Purpose and ‘Like Products’ in Article III:4 of the GATT (With Additional Remarks on 
Article III:2) 36 Journal of World Trade 3 (2002), 443-478; Further Thoughts on the Role of 
Regulatory Purpose Under Article III of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 37 Journal of World 
Trade 4 (2003), 737-760.  A further landmark contribution was provided by Henrik Horn and Petros C. 
Mavroidis, Still Hazy After all These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT / 
WTO Case-law on Tax Discriminaiton 15 European Journal of International Law (2004), 39-69.  
Continued support for this idea was recently expressed in, Nicholas DiMascio and Joost Pauwelyn, 
Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin? 
102 American Journal of International Law 1 (2008), 48-89 at 83-84.    
80 United States – Gasoline, Appellate Body report, page.23. 
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by the arguments in favour of the early consideration of the aim of the measure, or the 
underlying regulatory purpose, within the primary violation analysis?            
 
As noted in the introduction, it is commonly understood that anti-discrimination 
provisions in the WTO Treaty texts are intended to catch country-based discrimination.  
It can also be readily seen how enquiring into regulatory purpose assists in detecting 
origin based discrimination.  If there is a valid explanation for a challenged measure, it 
should be exonerated, even if the detrimental effect of the measure is felt mainly by 
imported products.  In contrast, the absence of such an explanation strongly suggests 
that the measure distinguishes between domestic and imported products based on the 
illegitimate criterion of their origin.  In themselves, these points establish only the 
imperative for regulatory purpose to be considered somewhere within the overall 
appraisal of a measure.  However, they also provide the foundation for further 
arguments in favour of the early consideration of regulatory purpose within the national 
treatment analysis.          
 
The main argument here appeals to what is presented as the ordinary meaning of the 
term ‘like products’ within GATT Article III.  Regan argues that a ban on the internal 
sale of plastic containers in a state which produces mainly cardboard containers may, 
or may not, amount to an Article III:4 violation.  Complaining states would argue that 
the ban results in the less favourable treatment of ‘like products’ on the basis of the 
previously close competitive relationship between the products and the clear disparate 
impact.  However, establishing this relationship does not demonstrate that the ban falls 
foul of the Article III:1 prohibition against applying measures ‘so as to afford protection 
to domestic production’.  This phrase implicates regulatory purpose, or the aim of the 
measure, which could have strong environmental credentials.  Should this explanation 
for the disparate impact of the measure be accepted, the products being compared 
should not to be regarded as ‘like’, thereby avoiding the primary violation.  
 
There is recent evidence in the case law of a comparable method which also does not 
define the national treatment standard solely with reference to disparate impact.  The 
difference with this method is that the focus is on the less favourable treatment standard 
rather than the like products issue.  An alleged Article III:4 national treatment violation 
in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes,81 centred on a requirement for both importers and 
domestic producers to post a bond of five million pesos to guarantee compliance with 
tax liabilities.  On a per cigarette basis, the fixed amount of the bond was less for 
domestic producers by reason of their higher market share relative to importers.  
Honduras argued that this disparate impact amounted to less favourable treatment.  The 
Appellate Body dismissed this argument, noting that, 
 
…the existence of a detrimental effect on a given imported product 
resulting from a measure does not necessarily imply that this measure 
accords less favourable treatment to imports if the detrimental effect is 
explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of 
the product, such as the market share of the importer in this case.82  
 
                                                 
81 Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, 
WT/DS302/AB/R (adopted 19 May 2005). 
82 Ibid., para. 96. 
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In this passage, the allegation of less favourable treatment is denied on the basis of a 
non-protectionist explanation for the disparate impact.  A slightly different way to think 
about this finding is that the challenged measure does not so much modify the 
conditions of competition between domestic and imported products, as reflect these 
conditions. 
 
The case for favouring these analytical methods is strengthened when supplemented 
with a perspective explained by Ortino on why a prohibition of de jure discrimination 
must be viewed differently from a prohibition on de facto discrimination:     
 
When the NT principle is defined simply on the basis of discriminatory 
‘language’ (i.e., nationality as the prohibited regulatory criterion) or of a 
limited notion of ‘inherent’ discrimination (i.e., ‘residence’, ‘religion’, 
‘language’ as the prohibited regulatory criteria), the prohibition of internal 
measures based on such formal regulatory criteria will be deemed to be in 
general an acceptable and reasonable rule…  
 
On the other hand, when the NT principle is defined on the basis of a 
larger concept—such as discriminatory ‘effect’—the normative balance 
between ‘rule’ and ‘exception’ changes dramatically. For example, a 
prohibition of origin-neutral measures with discriminatory effects vis-à-
vis imported products or investors may not on its own represent a 
legitimate norm. Without an inquiry into the public policy justification 
(and in particular into the relationship between the measure and its policy 
objective), the national treatment principle would simply be lacking the 
necessary normativity.83  
 
The extent to which the approach called for blurs the boundary between the primary 
violation and Article XX as a whole becomes apparent when the methodology for 
identifying regulatory purpose is considered.  Regan notes that a ‘failure to use less 
trade-restrictive measures that would achieve the asserted non-protectionist goal is 
strong evidence that the actual goal is protectionism.84 Of course, the availability of 
alternatives is among the tests developed by the Appellate Body to determine whether 
a measure is ‘necessary’ during provisional justification under Article XX.  It is also 
likely that, under the approach to the chapeau in Tyres, the availability of alternatives 
will be relevant to establishing the ‘rational connection’ between the reason for the 
discrimination and a recognized policy objective.  The potential for significant 
conflation of the primary violation and chapeau analyses can readily be seen.  If the 
measure amounts to a national treatment violation by reason of the failure to use 
reasonably available alternatives, the scope for finding the required ‘rational 
connection’ under the chapeau is, at the very least, significantly curtailed.  The measure 
would fail to satisfy the chapeau, for the same reasons as established the primary 
violation.85   
 
                                                 
83 Federico Ortino, From Non-Discrimination to Reasonableness: A Paradigm Shift in International 
Economic Law? Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/2005 at 49-50. 
84 Above note 79, at 451 and note 28. 
85 This is assuming that the analysis would reach the chapeau, since the early consideration of regulatory 
purpose also blurs a third boundary - that between the primary violation and provisional justification. 
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While accepting the persuasiveness of the arguments in favour of the early 
consideration of regulatory purpose, it is submitted that WTO tribunals would be well 
advised in most cases to retain a two-stage analysis dealing with the primary violation, 
and the justification.  This is the methodology suggested by the structure of the GATT 
and the GATS, something which is not always the position in other areas of 
international economic law.  Several contributions have drawn attention to the one-
stage analysis in the context of investment treaties by reason of the general non-
inclusion of general exceptions provisions.86  There is a more compelling case here for 
evaluating whether there is an acceptable reason for differentiating between 
investments within the determination of whether investors or investments are in ‘like 
circumstances’.  In the trade context, it is difficult to see what is lost by deferring the 
consideration of regulatory purpose until Article XX.   
 
There are perhaps two caveats here.  First is that Article XX provides only a closed list 
of exceptions.  It is in the recognition of other non-listed legitimate policies that the use 
of the methodology described above is most likely to be used.  Even here, however, it 
is submitted that it is preferable to discuss non-listed objectives under Article XX(d) 
where possible.  The danger might otherwise lie in the development of an Article XX 
‘light’ jurisprudence within the primary violation analysis, in which it might easier for 
a measure to be exonerated with reference to a non-listed objective than a listed 
objective.  The second caveat is that, in some cases, it might be appropriate to nip in 
the bud any allegation of a national treatment violation by using one or other of the 
techniques described above.  Dominican Republic – Cigarettes is an example of such a 
case.  A national treatment violation could have been confirmed based on the disparate 
impact, which might then have been examined under Article XX(d).87 However, the 
disparate impact of the measure was extremely small.88  This is something which might 
have contributed to the Appellate Body’s decision to deny the primary violation, just 
as the pronounced effects in Korea – Beef resulted in the opposite outcome. 
 
In sum, the recommendation is that the boundary between the primary violation and 
chapeau analyses should remain intact, while, at the same time, should not be regarded 
as impermeable.  This will occasionally lead to measures being exonerated within the 
primary violation analysis without recourse to Article XX, and other measures falling 
foul of the chapeau for the same reasons as established the primary violation.  This 
seems inevitable once it is accepted that anti-discrimination provisions in the WTO 
texts are intended to catch country based discrimination.  The panel’s alternative 
analysis in Tyres, in which trade effects would be decisive only under the chapeau, 
provides a means of differentiating the two analyses, but this does little to offset the 
disadvantages of this approach.  
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
86 Ortino, as note 83 above note; DiMascio and Pauwelyn, as note 79 above; Andrew Newcombe 
General Exceptions in International Investment Agreements, Paper presented at the BIICL Eighth 
Annual WTO Conference 13th and 14th May 2008, London.   
87 The question would then have been whether the fixed bond requirement would have been necessary 
to secure compliance with the tax liabilities.  
88 The panel noted that the bond had to be issued by financial institutions registered in the Dominican 
Republic.  The effective cost of the bond was therefore the fee charged by the issuing institution with  
the fee for the importer from Honduras being US$1873 or around 2 cents per thousand cigarettes.  
Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, panel report para. 7.299.    
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For several reasons, the tasks of attributing a distinct function to the chapeau, and 
distinct meaning to its terms, are difficult undertakings.  The chapeau was inserted in 
order to prevent abuse of the exceptions. Arguably, this additional clause was not 
required since the nexus requirements in the heads of provisional justification provide 
ample protection against their abuse.  For a measure already found to be necessary to 
be subject to further review under the chapeau is perhaps indicative of an ordering of 
values in favour of trade which is obviously now anachronistic.  The view that the 
chapeau functions to ensure that facially unobjectionable measures do not escape 
review if they are applied in an objectionable manner is also unconvincing.  There is 
little to prevent the manner in which measures are applied being considered before the 
chapeau is reached, and this may indeed be unavoidable.  As for attributing a distinct 
meaning to the chapeau terms, the difficulty stems from the centrality of the 
discrimination issue both here, and within some primary violations.   
 
Undeterred by these difficulties, the panel in Brazil – Tyres considered that the chapeau 
is intended to catch country based discrimination, but only if it ‘unjustifiable’ is the 
sense that it generates significant trade effects.  The panel’s desire for distinctive tests 
to apply in each stage of the appraisal of measures perhaps led it to lose sight of the 
need to ensure the workability of the decisive relevance of trade effects under the 
chapeau.  In contrast, the Appellate Body considered that the chapeau is designed to 
uncover country based discrimination which, by definition, is ‘unjustifiable’.  The 
single chapeau test which the Appellate Body has now explicitly endorsed would 
appear to be workable bearing in mind that it has been used in a number of cases.  In 
these cases, the test was not used altogether openly because, at first sight, it seems to 
blur the boundaries between the different stages associated with the overall appraisal of 
a measure.  It has been argued that this situation will rarely materialize in practice and, 
when it does, the effect is to preserve regulatory autonomy without creating too 
permissive an environment.  It has also been argued that WTO tribunals should respond 
with caution to calls for justificatory elements to be considered within the primary 
violation analysis.  The arguments in favour of the early consideration of regulatory 
purpose are entirely sound, but not overwhelming in the trade context.   
    
 
